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The amount of leisure time has been slow ly increasing , if a t a ll, in recent years. A t the same
time , enterta inment has become one of modern society’s essentia l pastimes, once a certa in
level of disposable income is achieved .  As a  result, audiovisua l enterprises primarily focus
on producing informa tion and enterta inment, the la tter being the more profitable . 
It has been sa id tha t a  motion p icture ta kes two years to ma ke ,  two hours to w a tch,  two
minutes to critici ze and two seconds to forge t.  Moviema king is very often an ungra te ful
enterprise ,  w ith no re la tionship wha tsoever be tween e ffort and result,  suffering and
app lause .
Some people would argue tha t audiovisua l production is about money and negotia tion. A
well-known European producer who temporarily ran a Hollywood studio once sa id tha t they
make dea ls, not movies. However, the bottom line is not the only aspect to consider when
making a picture . Enterta inment a lso has crea tive , socia l, cultura l and governmenta l
implica tions. Being responsible for the project, it is the producer’s job to find the difficult
ba lance between artistic qua lity, socia l and cultura l va lues and business profitability. 
1.1. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AUDIOVISUAL INDUSTRY
C inema , television and today’s new media have been variously defined as industria l arts,
forms of mass communica tion and cultura l or crea tive industries. The crea tion of fictiona l
audiovisua l content, or ‘cultura l enterta inment’ (movies, TV series or video-games), should
be contempla ted from a three-dimensiona l perspective: art, communica tion, business. Any
motion picture should be both profitable and a socia lly enriching work of art. A tta ining this
combina tion becomes more complex when government decides to get involved , in terms of
content and / or economic regula tion.
1.1.1. Cultural Aspects
Cultura l industries are those which produce commodities tha t somehow illustra te a society’s
way of life . Through sounds, images, words and pictures, they express socia l imag inary
and behavioura l pa tterns, the terms and symbols w ith which people think and communica te ,
shared socia l va lues and idea ls and the experience of socia l changes. Essentia lly, they act
as both mirror and modeller of society.
As such, movies, television programmes and other audiovisua l works are not simply
products like any others. To beg in w ith, they must overcome cultura l barriers when traded
across interna tiona l borders, which means tha t viewers in importing markets may find it
difficult to identify w ith the way of life , va lues, history, and even physica l environment
depicted , not to mention language diversity (in spite of dubbing or subtitling).
Having sa id tha t however, the demand for enterta inment itself cuts across a ll cultura l and
na tiona l boundaries, and many preferences (for laughter, music, or gambling) have deep-
sea ted psycholog ica l roots. This means tha t many enterta inment products can achieve
worldw ide market appea l and the resulting incrementa l revenues from interna tiona l sources
have an important effect on profitability.1
1: Vogel, Harold L., Enterta inment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial Analysis, 4th ed., Cambridge University press,
Cambridge, 1998.    
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Certa in films or programmes w ith added socia l va lues, known as “externa l impacts” , are
worthy enough in themselves to merit being made in spite of insufficient demand or
production costs tha t exceed the expected market return. In those cases, government
funding and support is appropria te . A t the same time , a  very profitable business w ith a high
nega tive externa l impact – like pornography or child abuse – should be deterred by the
industry and key market players.
The belief tha t audiovisua l contents and films can make viewers better citizens is a t the heart
of both the economic and cultura l arguments. A lthough it is not a lways apprecia ted , it
emerges as a  positive influence in the long run.
1.1.2. Government Regulation
Some critics believe media products’ added socia l va lues influence societa l behaviour.  This
ra ises the crucia l issue of whether industry professiona ls, socia l agents and government
should be held responsible for such audiovisua l content.
Motion pictures are a lso among tha t vast array of communica tion mass media tha t are
covered by constitutiona l protection aga inst government infringement of free speech. W hile
motion pictures are often thought by many to be exclusively enterta inment oriented there is
no clear cut division between informa tion, news and enterta inment, and a ll should receive
the same constitutiona l guarantees. N onetheless, there is never complete freedom of speech
in any mass media , especia lly when content approaches the limits of taste or depicts
extreme acts of violence . G overnment must tread softly when it seeks to limit motion picture
content, yet it cannot stand idly by and permit extremely distasteful and potentia lly harmful
actions in such an influentia l, persuasive , and imita tive medium as is film. Under the threa t
of rig id government rules, the industry has established its own set of self-censorship
standards and a corresponding “ra ting system” to guide viewers w ith respect to the level of
sex and violence portrayed in any particular movie .
The protection of the marketplace of discourse has led to a different response from those
government agencies who are responsible for protecting the economic system aga inst the
entrenchment of monopoly power and restoring competition wherever possible . The antitrust
authorities have pa id specia l a ttention to motion pictures and other mass media because the
concentra tion of market power, especia lly in the hands of the ma jor studios, could tamper
w ith the free play of forces in the marketplace of ideas and thus threa ten the vita lity of any
freedom of speech. W ith censorship , the role of government was to remove itself or else
play an advisory role; however, w ith antitrust, government must play an active role in
restructuring the industry by breaking down barriers to entry, preventing harmful mergers,
or exposing and then undoing illega l conspiracies tha t undermine the automa tic functioning
of the marketplace and substitute priva te ga in for socia l good .
1.2. ECONOMIC ISSUES OF THE AUDIOVISUAL BUSINESS
Crea ting an audiovisua l product demands a  significant investment of time , money and
human resources and mistakes can be crucia l. It is a  highly risky business due to the huge





is very uncerta in and unpredictable . There is no direct rela tion between cost and
profitability, budget and artistic qua lity. 
O f course , these parameters don’t exactly apply to television, where mass production is
standardised and prototypes are just the initia l step . A lso, production budgets are not as
high as in film and the rela tion between investment and amortisa tion is more ba lanced .
The enterta inment sector is a  grow ing and rapidly chang ing interna tiona l business and the
study of its economic characteristics is still a t an early stage . However, there are certa in
characteristics tha t distinguish it from other more conventiona l businesses. W ha t follows is
a brief description of some of the more relevant 2. 
An Industry of Prototypes
Each product (film, television programme or series) is like a new company, requiring the
close a ttention of a  team of people (actors, writers, director, technicians) and technica l
elements tha t do not necessarily coincide w ith previous productions.
Importance of Development 
The development process is key in obta ining a qua lity product. Successive script revisions,
choosing the cast and crew, deciding loca tions, etc. are a ll aspects contributing to this goa l.
No Guarantees
Success of one product does not guarantee success in the future . O bviously, a  series of
continuous successes contributes to consolida ting a company’s market va lue (producer,
distributor, TV network), making it more a ttractive to investors and crea tive ta lent. However,
there is never an absolute guarantee the next project w ill be a success: the fina l verdict
depends on the public, which is difficult to predict.
Joint-Consumption Goods
Audiovisua l works are considered joint-consumption goods, which means tha t the individua l
view ing of a  film or a television programme does not use up the product or detract from the
view ing experience of others. In other words, additiona l viewers have no effect on cost in
a g iven market. Movies and programmes are long-life , easily copied and distributed
products. In fact, copying and distributing costs are very low compared to production costs.
(In this sense , television is a  much easier and cheaper medium than cinema from the trade
point of view, since it doesn’t need a number of physica l copies as does thea trica l
distribution.
Slow Recoupment 
Recovering (or recouping) the investment occurs over a  rela tively long period of time and
the degree of uncerta inty w ith respect to the capacity to recover is high in the audiovisua l
sector.
Access to Capital 
The cost of capita l and the amount of it required for audiovisua l opera tions is a  formidable
barrier to entry by new competitors. Most enterta inment industry segments thus come to be
ruled by large companies w ith rela tively easy access to large pools of capita l. Such
2: Vogel, Harold L., Enterta inment Industry Economics: A Guide for Financial Analysis, 4th ed., Cambridge University press,
Cambridge, 1998. 
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tendencies can, for example , be seen in distribution of recorded music and movies, and in
the gaming , theme park, cable , video game , and broadcasting industries.
US Dominance
Interna tiona l hegemony of the ma jors is not only present during production but a lso
throughout the entire distribution process, exercising considerable pressure on exhibitors to
elimina te competition.
Joining Forces
M arket competition and the standardisa tion of the American box-office hit have forced film-
makers to unite their efforts (co-productions) in order to undertake productions of similar
sca le , including the increased complexity tha t comes w ith it.
Reliance on Blockbuster Success 
During the steady-sta te growth phase of the enterta inment business (i.e ., a fter a  segment has
a tta ined a size a t which long-run domina tion by severa l large companies has been
established), profits genera ted by a very few highly popular products are necessary to offset
losses incurred by many mediocre projects. This is evident in movies, of network television
production, toys and video games, and recorded music. (This tendency is rela tively
uncommon in the performing arts ca tegory, where even a few occasiona l hits cannot
counterba lance chronic opera ting deficits).
Importance of Marketing 
Potentia l consumers of enterta inment products or services must be constantly made aware
of the products’ unique fea tures. In addition, the life cycle of an enterta inment product may
be very brief. Therefore , be it theme parks or a  new video game , per-unit marketing
expenditures tend to be large rela tive to tota l unit costs of opera tion or production, typica lly
adding a t least 50% to the cost of the average ma jor fea ture film release . In economic
terms, such spending on marketing tends to make demand less sensitive to price (i.e ., more
price-inelastic). 
Determing Role of Ancillary Markets 
As a  result of sunk-cost characteristics - in which a lmost every dollar of revenue goes first
towards recouping direct costs - enterta inment products often derive a large proportion of
their returns from ancillary or secondary markets. This a lso means tha t price-discrimina tion
opportunities between classes of consumers having different demand elasticities can be
exploited . Films, for instance , on average now derive over ha lf their revenues from exposure
on cable and home video as opposed to initia l thea trica l release . Spin-offs of character
licenses into popular TV series or movie sequels and novelisa tions may often be sources of
significant additiona l income . Price-discrimina tion effects are readily observed in the pricing
of tickets to cultura l events and in the sequencing of a  movie through the various exhibition
w indows. 
Lack of Standardisation 
This rea lity benefits entrepreneurs but damages rela tive-productive ga ins. There are two
important consequences of such nonstandardisa tion: 
i) Desp ite the o ligopo listic  framework,  there is considerab le freedom for the





are uniquely produced , often orig ina ted by individua ls working a lone or in sma ll
groups and not by g iant corpora te committees. O ne can become rich and famous as
a direct result of one’s own crea tive efforts. 
ii) The entrepreneuria l spirit, and thus the importance of the individua l to the productive
process, is accommoda ted by means of w idely varying , uniquely ta ilored financing
arrangements. This is especia lly evident in movies, recorded music and sports. 
Advantages Offered by New Technologies
Fortuna tely, ongoing technolog ica l development continues to make it easier and less
expensive to manufacture , distribute and receive enterta inment products and services. O ver
the long term, this leads to more varied and more a ffordable mass-market enterta inment.
High Costs, Low Returns 
A lso, because pictures are financed largely w ith other people’s money, there is an a lmost
unavoidable bias for costs to rise a t least as fast as anticipa ted revenues. This implies tha t
much of the incrementa l income expected from the growth of new-media sources is likely to
be absorbed , dissipa ted , and diverted as cost—an especia lly daunting considera tion if, as
is now common for a film released by a ma jor studio, only a much diminished 50% (or
more) share of such costs are recovered directly from domestic thea trica l renta ls. Costs have
often grown faster than revenues and industry opera ting marg ins have been erra tic.
Using da ta on the number of releases, the effects of ancillary-market revenue growth,
average nega tive costs, average marketing costs, and aggrega te renta ls, there emerges a
profile suggesting tha t, sta tistica lly speaking , most ma jor-distributed films do no better than
financia lly break-even—w ith devia tions from this mean extreme in both directions. Yet,
remarkably, and despite the potentia l for loss on an “ average” picture , most ma jor studios,
bolstered by distribution revenues rela ted to library titles and television programmes, have
long been successfully engaged in this business.
The ex istence of profitab le stud io enterprises in the face of losses for the “ average”
p icture c an be reconciled only when it is rea lised tha t the heart of a  stud io’s business is
d istribution and financing and tha t, therefore , the brunt of marketing and production-cost
risk is often deflected and / or transferred to (sometimes tax-she ltered) outside investors
and producers. 
1.3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AUDIOVISUAL INDUSTRY 
1.3.1. Film Industry Pioneers 
The first movements in filmmaking activity were defined by technolog ica l competence in
wha t was referred to as the “pa tents war” . Film industry pioneers on both sides of the
A tlantic achieved prestige and popularity thanks to their technolog ica l innova tions in the
reg istra tion and reproduction of images. During the last decade of the 19 th century, men
like Thomas A . Edison in the United Sta tes, the Lumière brothers in France , the
Skladanowsky brothers in G ermany and Robert W. Paul in the United Kingdom, pa tented
similar machines for recording and projecting moving images: the Kinetograph and
Kinetoscope (Edison), C inema tograph (Lumières), Biograph and Bioscope (Skladanowskys),
Anima tograph (Paul), Vitagraph and Vitascope (Arma t and Edison).
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It soon became apparent tha t wha t was truly interesting about this new spectacle wasn’t the
mechanica l inventions, but the moving images themselves. Riva l projector manufacturers
had to produce their own films, since they sold their machines together w ith a sma ll stock
of content. It was a  one-man industria l process.
By the early 1900s, filmmaking was long overdue for film directors who “ invented” the
basics of film language and became the storytellers of the new century. N ames like
Segundo de Chomón, G eorge Méliès, Abel G ance and  Fritz Lang , (in Europe); and Edw in
S. Porter, D. W. Griffith, and Charles Chaplin (in the United Sta tes), would contribute to
crea te films as we know them, incorpora ting complex production techniques and
manipula ting time and space through crosscut editing . Stories of approxima tely fifteen-
minutes (a  so-ca lled one-reeler) soon became the industry standard . Essentia lly, the movie
industry had crossed the imag inary line from mere novelty to art form; and , more
importantly, a  new and powerful cultura l influence .
However, entrepreneuria l instinct was still seriously lacking in the new industry. A  new
genera tion of entrepreneurs was needed - like Charles Pa thé , Léon G aumont and O le O lsen
- who developed the first film production and distribution companies and initia lly domina ted
the new film market. Surprisingly, a ll of them were European.
The development of cinema in the U .S. took a  step further when the nickelodeon thea tre
arrived in 1905 , which gave the movie industry its first rea l opportunity to stand on its own
as an enterta inment industry ra ther than as a  mere complement to vaudeville shows. W hile
problems of film product incompa tibility still rema ined , the new ly forming exchange system
of distribution was clearly standardising the product to facilita te leasing practices. In short,
the arriva l of nickelodeons was the first step in the development of motion pictures as a  full-
fledged mass medium, which had a lready happened in Europe .
During cinema’s early decades hegemony was clearly European. But the U.S. was a
sleeeping giant tha t when awoken, started to re-conquer its own territory first. The pa tent
manufacturers decided to join forces, forming a film production trust ca lled Motion Picture
Pa tents Corpora tion (MPPC) in 1908 to control the domestic market and two years la ter
added the distribution arm, a subsidiary firm named G enera l Film Company. By 1912 , 80%
of domestic releases in the U.S. were American. Unfortuna tely, Pa thé and O lsen didn’t
emula te this stra tegy and missed the opportunity to crea te a big European consortium aga inst
the American colossus. From then on, the European power never managed to recover.
1.3.2.The Hollywood Studio System and the European Response
W hile the popularity of films grew, a  sma ll group of companies tried to acquire monopoly
power in the fledgling industry by manipula ting the pa tent process. The industry was broken
down into four, largely separa te , sectors: equipment manufacturing , production of film
product, distribution of product via loca l exchanges, and , lastly, exhibition of product a t
nickelodeons. O f a ll these areas, the exhibition sector was the most competitive , since the
capita l cost of setting up a single nickelodeon was minima l.
By applying the same management principles to the film business which susta ined other





Hollywood studio system succeeded in crea ting the most efficient movie factories in the
world . These movie moguls were: M arcus Loew (Loew’s Inc., 1905), C arl Laemmle
(Universa l, 1912), W illiam Fox (Fox Film Corpora tion, 1915), Samuel G oldwyn (G oldwyn
Pictures, 1916), Adolph Zukor (Paramount Pictures, 1916), Louis B. M ayer (M ayer
Production Co., 1919), and the Warner Brothers ( Warner Brothers, 1923). Basica lly, the
studio system was characterised by three factors: vertica l integra tion as industry structure
and market oligopoly; a  management stra tegy based on decentra lisa tion, work division and
specia lisa tion and mass production; and fina lly, the search for simultaneous style uniformity
together w ith product differentia tion via different genres and the star system.
By 1925 a monopoly scenario was present, controlled by five fully developed companies:
(Paramount, Loew’s, 20 th Century-Fox, Warner Brothers and Radio-Keith- Orpheum / RK O), who
were the primary producer-distributors of “A” qua lity films, known as the Big Five or ma jors.
O pera ting only production and distribution arms, and providing the lower qua lity “B” films,
tha t filled the lower ha lf of the double bill were three partia lly developed companies (Universa l,
Columbia and United Artists). These were ca lled the Little Three or mini-ma jors. Fina lly, there
were three other independent sma ll companies (Disney, Monogram and Republic), whose
ma in activity was producing secondary genres, such as cartoons or westerns. 
Acting simultaneously, the Big Five , Little Three and the a ligned independents crea ted an
impenetrable entry barrier to the movie business. Together the Big Five owned one third of
cinema circuits, but genera ted three quarters of the tota l box office gross. During this
period , they released three quarters of the tota l number of non- Western films. O f course ,
they had to fight time and aga in aga inst the antitrust menace . 
In the studio system producers were the key figures; they were the centra l pieces in the gears
of the entire industry. As far as the director and company were concerned , the producer
was the immedia te boss on the project. 
A fter World War O ne , there were different a ttempts in Europe to re-establish big production
and distribution companies, w ith loca l government support. From about 1915 to 1925
na tiona l a lliances of producers and distributors emerged in severa l European countries as
a way to compete aga inst the American colossus. This movement was ca lled “Film Europe”
which included Universum-Film Ag (UFA) in G ermany (1917), Unione C inema togra fica
Ita liana (UC I) in Ita ly (1919), and Sovkino in Soviet Union (1925).  Additiona lly, partners
from different countries joined forces to crea te two big European studios, Pa thé- Westi
(1924) and the A lliance C inéma tographique Européen (A CE), formed by the Swedish
Svenska , UFA and some French investors. 
W ith UFA’s rise to become the second largest production company in the world , Europe
seemed to recover some of its splendour, but this was a  brief mirage . O nce aga in, the
controversia l circumstances of its politica l and socia l life prevented these initia tives from
being consolida ted . European film industries didn’t grasp or couldn’t apply the manageria l
principles tha t founded the Hollywood studio system. In Europe , cinema was conceived
either as politica l and socia l propaganda or as an exclusively artistic language . In the end ,
the effect was inevitable: Europe lost its audience to never recover it. W hen it fina lly made
this rea lisa tion, film audiences’ tastes a ll over the world were “ Americanised” , thanks to the
classica l style of storytelling and the universa lly appea ling star system.
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Meanwhile , exhibitors tried to defend their interests by forming their own organisa tion
ca lled First N a tiona l Exhibitors C ircuit. This triggered a vast merger race as a ll the large
companies in each stage of production sought merger partners to guarantee either an
assured supply of films or access a t reasonable terms. By 1925 , there were only a handful
of g iant vertica lly integra ted firms left in the industry and , from this point on, the industry
would forever fa ll under the control of strong oligopoly firms.
1.3.3. The Dismantling of the Studio System and the European
Renaissance
Severa l factors contributed to the decline and disappearance of the Hollywood studio
system, including the Grea t Depression and the Second World War, which reduced
overseas grosses. But the principa l ca ta lysts were television and the Antitrust leg isla tion.
A fter a  long fierce lega l ba ttle tha t lasted a lmost ten years, Hollywood motion picture
corpora tions were obliged to dismantle the vertica l monopoly in 1949 and reduce their
interests in the exhibition sector. This na tura lly opened up the market for independent
producers and distributors, as the ma jors decided to reduce their risks by cutting back on
in-house productions and to obta in economies of sca le in distribution. Paradoxica lly, the
same group of people they had sought to elimina te only a few years before had now
become crucia lly important for their surviva l. 
From then on, distribution would rapidly become the new core of business and profits for
the industry, a lthough it suffered competition from television during the first few years of
coexistence . 
Europe w itnessed this disintegra tion process w ith hope . A fter World War Two, European
countries tried to re-build their damaged economies. From the film industry’s standpoint,
Europe didn’t manage to promote favourable conditions for the movie making business,
since the three segments (production, distribution and exhibition) weren’t vertica lly
integra ted in any way in most countries. Moreover, there wasn’t a  rea l film economy, but
an artificia l one , since financia l support was ma inly sta te-funded . O n top of tha t, the
European film industry was primarily “director-driven” , eclipsing the producer figure ,
causing the business sense of the film activity to a lmost disappear. It was an industry made
by individua ls, not by companies.
Despite these obstacles, the reconstruction of most European film industries was led by
single producers who emula ted their classica l Hollywood counterparts - men like Pierre
Braunberger in France ,  Cecchi G ori in Ita ly and A lfredo M a tas in Spa in. Little by little ,
na tiona l film industries grew and consolida ted a minima l offer of loca l cinema , enough for
their market demand , though by then Hollywood dominance was absolute .
The la te fifties and the sixties marked the so-ca lled “golden age” of European film, defined
by the boom of co-productions and grea ter film audiences. From 1955 to 1965 , the





especia lly Rome were the new sets for Hollywood productions. M any loca l film industries
benefited from American financia l support, achieving a never before seen qua lity of
production and distribution.
1.3.4. The Impact of Television
The initia l reaction of the motion picture industry to the emerg ing television industry was one
of contempt. N ot only was the sma ll screen audiovisua l experience poor, but the production
standard and qua lity was inferior. In addition, the cost of industria l adapta tion to television
technology was expensive and beyond many studios’ investment capabilities.
However, as television became more popular and people stayed home to wa tch free
programmes and movies, the motion picture industry began to rea lise the rea l danger of the
new competitor: in the first ten years of competition, (1946 to 1956), U .S. thea tre
admissions suffered a 50% decrease and the ma jors’ profits decreased 25% during the first
three years of coexistence .
Initia l disda in then became an a ttempt to boycott this new industry, forbidding crea tive
personnel under contract (primarily actors) to work for television, and pressuring large
producer-distributors not to license current or past films from their library for television
broadcasting . But the popularity of the new medium made it evident tha t it was a  lost war. 
So the studios decided to compete w ith and make profitable use of television, concentra ting
their efforts on magnifying the cinema experience , by producing event-movies, and
initia ting a revolution in subject ma tter, breaking w ith socia l taboos like violence , profanity
and sex, and exploring politica lly incorrect topics. 
Secondly, they crea ted their own television divisions from 1955 onwards and such famous
studio-sponsored programmes as “ Warner Bros. presents” , “The 20 th Century-Fox Hour” ,
“M G M Parade” or “Disneyland” . 
Lastly, the studios rea lised tha t television networks could become subsidiary markets for
licensing recent and classic thea trica l films, once those films had reached the sa tura tion
level of thea trica l exhibition. This provided films a  new commercia l w indow and a chance
to increase profits. In 1966 history was made when ABC pa id 2 million dollars for the rights
of The Bridge O ver the Kwa i River. W ha t had begun as a  ma jor confronta tion between two
enterta inment media ended up a mutua lly dependent partnership and economic symbiosis.
In Europe , television development followed a different pa th. W hile G ermany and Brita in
para lleled America’s pace of TV penetra tion, France , Spa in and Ita ly lagged behind . In
most of Europe television was initia lly established as a  public and monopolised industry
until deregula tion took place .
A lthough once commercia lised television had excellent consequences for film producers by
becoming the first financia l a llies of motion pictures, from the cinemas’ point of view, the
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arriva l of television brought w ith it a  significant decrease in admission revenue throughout
a ll of Europe , the decline being the most staggering in those countries where cinema was
most popular (Brita in, G ermany and Ita ly), whose audiences were drastica lly reduced by
more than 80%.
1.3.5. Diversification and Consolidation
The long period from the 1960s to the 1990s is as complex as it is interesting. The end of the
studio system and the coming of television acted as an earthquake, shaking up the entire
audiovisua l panorama , in both the U.S. and Europe. The industry forcibly underwent a process
of diversifica tion thanks to the new leisure offers, including domestic video, while technologica l
innova tion and the new economy spurred trends of concentra ting business efforts.
The market expansion tha t television brought didn’t succeed in mitiga ting the ma jors’
financia l crisis. Ticket prices had risen 50% in rea l terms since the post-war years but movie
going was on the decline worldw ide .
The 60s marked the beg inning of a  long succession of large-sca le entrepreneuria l a lliances
which threw some of the most renowned ma jors into the arms of grea t corpora tions, not
necessarily rela ted to the enterta inment business. Universa l was sold in 1962 to Music
Corpora tion of America (M C A); Transamerica Corpora tion took over United Artists in
1967; and in 1968 Warner Brothers and Seven Arts were incorpora ted by Kinney N a tiona l
Services. 
From the mid-80s onwards, this tendency increased . By the end of the decade Japanese
hardware firms Sony and M a tshusita landed in Hollywood and became the new owners of
Columbia and M C A -Universa l respectively. These mergers were the first in a long cha in of
joint ventures and buy-outs - which continues today - a imed a t crea ting big multimedia
corpora tions as a  way to survive in a more competitive , sophistica ted and globa l market. 
The ’Condominium Era’
Changes a lso occurred in the production-distribution rela tionship . In wha t is commonly
referred to as the condominium era of motion picture-making , studios rented out space on
their lots to independent producers a ligned w ith the ma jors and established different
production agreements in order to share risks (output dea ls, first-look dea ls, etc.). N ot
surprisingly, when a ma jor agreed to distribute an independent’s picture or provide
financing , the independent was often virtua lly forced to mortgage a ll its rights and split the
profits as a  quid pro quo for landing the distribution contract w ith a ma jor. 
Multiplexes
N ew developments a lso occurred in the exhibition sector. The most prominent was the
popula tion migra tion out of cities to suburbs, a  worldw ide phenomenon from 1960
onwards. The new residentia l areas a ttracted a ll kind of services and facilities, including
leisure . Movie thea tres moved from the downtown area to shopping ma lls in nearby
suburbs, transformed from single-screen to multi-screen thea tres - the multiplex. 
This transforma tion a ffected the economics of opera ting motion picture thea tres. Multiplexes





offer of titles to choose from a t the same physica l site . In addition, the multiple-screen
concept is tied in w ith the shopping ma ll phenomenon, where the different shops benefit
from the huge foot tra ffic the diversity of the ma ll offering crea tes. Multiplex owners
understood tha t the secret to a ttracting grea ter audience numbers was investing in
improving thea tres’ technolog ica l conditions - sound and screen projection standards,
sea ting comfort, etc. Film audiences started grow ing a t the end of the 80s, the same time
multiplexes were genera lly adopted as the thea trica l standard in many countries.
Video
Lastly, the video industry and market emerged as a  necessary technolog ica l development
for the television industry. O ver time , new video technica l standards improved television
production thanks to its recording and storing capability as well as its portability. The
domestic video industry rea lly took hold in the 80s, thanks to the popularity of videocassette
recorders. N ot only had a new industry been crea ted , but a  whole new market for movies
was born. 
Initia lly the studios didn’t pay too much a ttention to the possibilities video offered . A  few
sma ll production and distribution companies, like Vestron, C arolco, C annon and Hemda le ,
took over the emerg ing market, offering low-budget mass appea l movies. However, their
reign didn’t last long as the ma jors found no rea l competition when they decided to enter
into the new market. A ll of them opened video divisions as a  part of their distribution
business a t practica lly no cost, and made their libraries ava ilable to the new market. It was
the beg inning of the third commercia l w indow, which would become the most profitable for
many years.
1.3.6. The Digital Revolution 
The new configura tion of the audiovisua l industry and markets has been propelled by the
dig ita l revolution, which marks the beg inning of a  new era in the historica l evolution of the
aud iovisua l industry. Follow ing the industria l standard isa tion imposed by the first
entrepreneurs, the new order unites three kinds of companies: hardware manufacturers,
software and content providers, and telecommunica tions technology suppliers. 
Having learnt from their previous mistakes of under-estima ting the business potentia l of
television and video, Hollywood studios and large interna tiona l corpora tions didn’t want to
miss the new technology tra in. Even w ith an uncerta in future ahead , most of the ma jors
made risky investments to get ready in advance for the upcoming multimedia market,
developing their own multimedia divisions. Some symptoms forecasted the positive industry
reaction, such as the rapid growth ra te of interactive software providers, like Sega ,
N intendo, Xiphias. In addition, the Internet was soon used as a  marketing tool for movies.
Then the new multimedia w indow was consolida ted through webcasting (online radio and
television). 
The key stra teg ic reason behind studios’ opera tions was to control the entire process of
production, distribution and commercia lisa tion of content (informa tion and enterta inment),
in a new form of vertica l integra tion. By controlling the successive va lue of products through
a ll commercia l w indows, the audiovisua l g iants could maximise profitability. Curiously, the
audiovisua l panorama has aga in acquired the form of a  monopoly, where a few multimedia
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groups control most of the informa tion and enterta inment products. These groups currently
produce 80% of movies, 70% of fiction for television and 50% of music. A  rea lignment of
power between the ma jor studios has taken place and once marg ina l mini-ma jors have
become leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Disney and Universa l. 
The synergy between the motion picture and television industries and the multimedia -
interactive industry is still in its early stages. Dig ita l technology is opening up a whole new
world w ithout crea tive frontiers, where the only limit is the filmmaker’s imag ina tion (as
opposed to cost). The success of audiovisua l products is now measured by its potentia l to
be globa lly exploited in each w indow, from thea tres to video games, comics to musica ls.
